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Abstract
In mean-payoff games, the objective of the protagonist is to ensure that the limit average of an
infinite sequence of numeric weights is nonnegative. In energy games, the objective is to ensure
that the running sum of weights is always nonnegative. Generalized mean-payoff and energy
games replace individual weights by tuples, and the limit average (resp. running sum) of each
coordinate must be (resp. remain) nonnegative. These games have applications in the synthesis
of resource-bounded processes with multiple resources.
We prove the finite-memory determinacy of generalized energy games and show the inter-
reducibility of generalized mean-payoff and energy games for finite-memory strategies. We also
improve the computational complexity for solving both classes of games with finite-memory
strategies: while the previously best known upper bound was EXPSPACE, and no lower bound
was known, we give an optimal coNP-complete bound. For memoryless strategies, we show that
the problem of deciding the existence of a winning strategy for the protagonist is NP-complete.
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1 Introduction
Graph games and multi-objectives. Two-player games on graphs are central in many appli-
cations of computer science. For example, in the synthesis problem, implementations are
obtained from winning strategies in games with a qualitative objective such as ω-regular
specifications [18, 17, 1]. In these applications, the games have a qualitative (boolean)
objective that determines which player wins. On the other hand, games with quantitative
objective which are natural models in economics (where players have to optimize a real-valued
payoff) have also been studied in the context of automated design [19, 10, 20]. In the recent
past, there has been considerable interest in the design of reactive systems that work in
resource-constrained environments (such as embedded systems). The specifications for such
reactive systems are quantitative, and these give rise to quantitative games. In most system
design problems, there is no unique objective to be optimized, but multiple, potentially
conflicting objectives. For example, in designing a computer system, one is interested not
only in minimizing the average response time but also the average power consumption. In this
work we study such multi-objective generalizations of the two most widely used quantitative
objectives in games, namely, mean-payoff and energy objectives [11, 20, 6, 3].
Generalized mean-payoff games. A generalized mean-payoff game is played on a finite weighted
game graph by two players. The vertices of the game graph are partitioned into positions
that belong to Player 1 and positions that belong to Player 2. Edges of the graphs are
labeled with k-dimensional vectors w of integer values, i.e., w ∈ Zk. The game is played as
follows. A pebble is placed on a designated initial vertex of the game graph. The game is
∗ Full proofs are available in [9].
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played in rounds in which the player owning the position where the pebble lies moves the
pebble to an adjacent position of the graph using an outgoing edge. The game is played for
an infinite number of rounds, resulting in an infinite path through the graph, called a play.
The value associated to a play is the mean value in each dimension of the vectors of weights
labeling the edges of the play. Accordingly, the winning condition for Player 1 is defined by
a vector of integer values v ∈ Zk that specifies a threshold for each dimension. A play is
winning for Player 1 if its vector of mean values is at least v. All other plays are winning
for Player 2, thus the game is zero-sum. We are interested in the problem of deciding the
existence of a finite-memory winning strategy for Player 1 in generalized mean-payoff games.
Note that in general infinite memory may be required to win generalized mean-payoff games,
but for practical applications such as the synthesis of reactive systems with multiple resource
constraints, the generalized mean-payoff games with finite memory is the relevant model.
Moreover, they provide the framework for the synthesis of specifications defined by [2, 8],
and the synthesis question for such specifications under regular (ultimately periodic) words
correspond to generalized mean-payoff games with finite-memory strategies.
Generalized energy games. In generalized energy games, the winning condition for Player 1
requires that, given an initial credit v0 ∈ Nk, the sum of v0 and all the vectors labeling edges
up to position i in the play is nonnegative, for all i ∈ N. The decision problem for generalized
energy games asks whether there exists an initial credit v0 and a strategy for Player 1 to
maintain the energy nonnegative in all dimensions against all strategies of Player 2.
Contributions. In this paper, we study the strategy complexity and computational complexity
of solving generalized mean-payoff and energy games. Our contributions are as follows.
First, we show that generalized energy and mean-payoff games are determined when played
with finite-memory strategies, however, they are not determined for memoryless strategies.
For generalized energy games determinacy under finite-memory coincides with determinacy
under arbitrary strategies (each player has a winning strategy iff he has a finite-memory
winning strategy). In contrast, we show for generalized mean-payoff games that determinacy
under finite-memory and determinacy under arbitrary strategies do not coincide. Thus
with finite-memory strategies these games are determined, they correspond to the synthesis
question with ultimately periodic words, and enjoy pleasant mathematical properties like
existence of the limit of the mean value of the weights, and hence we focus on the study of
generalized mean-payoff and energy games with finite-memory strategies.
Second, we show that under the hypothesis that both players play either finite-memory or
memoryless strategies, the generalized mean-payoff game and the generalized energy game
problems are equivalent.
Third, our main contribution is the study of the computational complexity of the decision
problems for generalized mean-payoff games and generalized energy games, both for finite-
memory strategies and the special case of memoryless strategies. Our complexity results can
be summarized as follows: (A) For finite-memory strategies, we provide a nondeterministic
polynomial time algorithm for deciding negative instances of the problems1. Thus we
show that the decision problems are in coNP. This significantly improves the complexity as
compared to the EXPSPACE algorithm that can be obtained by reduction to Vass (vector
addition systems with states) [4]. Furthermore, we establish a coNP lower bound for these
problems by reduction from the complement of the 3SAT problem, hence showing that the
problem is coNP-complete. (B) For the case of memoryless strategies, as the games are not
1 Negative instances are those where Player 1 is losing, and by determinacy under finite-memory where
Player 2 is winning.
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determined, we consider the problem of determining if Player 1 has a memoryless winning
strategy. First, we show that the problem of determining if Player 1 has a memoryless
winning strategy is in NP, and then show that the problem is NP-hard (i) even when the
weights are restricted to {−1, 0, 1}; or (ii) when the weights are arbitrary and the dimension
is 2.
Related works. Mean-payoff games, which are the one-dimension version of our generalized
mean-payoff games, have been extensively studied starting with the works of Ehrenfeucht
and Mycielski in [11] where they prove memoryless determinacy for these games. Because of
memoryless determinacy, it is easy to show that the decision problem for mean-payoff games
lies in NP ∩ coNP, but despite large research efforts, no polynomial time algorithm is known
for that problem. A pseudo-polynomial time algorithm has been proposed by Zwick and
Paterson in [20], and improved in [5]. The one-dimension special case of generalized energy
games have been introduced in [6] and further studied in [3] where log-space equivalence
with classical mean-payoff games is established.
Generalized energy games can be viewed as games played on Vass (vector addition
systems with states) where the objective is to avoid unbounded decreasing of the counters.
A solution to such games on Vass is provided in [4] (see in particular Lemma 3.4 in [4]) with
a PSPACE algorithm when the weights are {−1, 0, 1}, leading to an EXPSPACE algorithm
when the weights are arbitrary integers. We drastically improve the EXPSPACE upper-bound
by providing a coNP algorithm for the problem, and we also provide a coNP lower bound
even when the weights are restricted to {−1, 0, 1}.
2 Generalized Mean-payoff and Energy Games
Well quasi-orders. Let D be a set. A relation  over D is a well quasi-order, wqo for
short, if the following holds: (a)  is transitive and reflexive; and (b) for all f : N → D,
there exists i1, i2 ∈ N such that i1 < i2 and f(i1)  f(i2).
I Lemma 1. (Nk,≤) is well quasi-ordered.
Multi-weigthed two-player game structures. A multi-weigthed two-player game struc-
ture is a tuple G = (S1, S2, sinit, E, k, w) where S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, and Si (i = 1, 2) is the finite set
of Player i positions, sinit ∈ S1 is the initial position, E ⊆ (S1 ∪ S2)× (S1 ∪ S2) is the set of
edges such that for all s ∈ S1 ∪ S2, there exists s′ ∈ S1 ∪ S2 such that (s, s′) ∈ E, k ∈ N is
the dimension of the multi-weights, w : E → Zk is the multi-weight labeling function. G is a
multi-weighted one-player game structure if S2 = ∅.
A play in G is an infinite sequence of pi = s0s1 . . . sn . . . such that (i) s0 = sinit, (ii) for
all i ≥ 0 we have (si, si+1) ∈ E. A play pi = s0s1 . . . sn . . . is ultimately periodic if it can
be decomposed as pi = ρ1 · ρω2 where ρ1 and ρ2 are two finite sequences of positions. The
prefix up to position n of a play pi = s0s1 . . . sn . . . is the finite sequence pi(n) = s0s1 . . . sn,
its last element sn is denoted by Last(pi(n)). A prefix pi(n) belongs to Player i (i ∈ {1, 2})
if Last(pi(n)) ∈ Si. The set of plays in G is denoted by Plays(G), the corresponding set of
prefixes is denoted by Prefs(G), the set of prefixes that belongs to Player i (i ∈ {1, 2}) is
denoted by Prefsi(G), and the set of ultimately periodic plays in G is denoted by Playsup(G).
The energy level vector of a prefix of play ρ = s0s1 . . . sn is EL(ρ) =
∑i=n−1
i=0 w(si, si+1),
and the mean-payoff vector of an ultimately periodic play pi = s0s1 . . . sn . . . is MP(pi) =
limn→∞ 1nEL(pi(n)).
Strategies. A strategy for Player i (i ∈ {1, 2}) in G is a function λi : Prefsi(G)→ S1 ∪ S2
such that for all ρ ∈ Prefsi(G) we have (Last(ρ), λi(ρ)) ∈ E. A play pi = s0s1 · · · ∈ Plays(G)
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is consistent with a strategy λi of Player i if sj+1 = λi(s0s1 . . . sj) for all j ≥ 0 such that
sj ∈ Si. The outcome of a pair of strategies, λ1 for Player 1 and λ2 for Player 2, is the
(unique) play which is consistent with both λ1 and λ2. We denote outcomeG(λ1, λ2) this
outcome.
A strategy λ1 for Player 1 has finite-memory if it can be encoded by a deterministic
Moore machine (M,m0, αu, αn) whereM is a finite set of states (the memory of the strategy),
m0 ∈ M is the initial memory state, αu : M × (S1 ∪ S2) → M is an update function, and
αn : M × Si → S1 ∪ S2 is the next-action function. If the game is in a Player-1 position
s ∈ S1 and m ∈ M is the current memory value, then the strategy chooses s′ = αn(m, s)
as the next position and the memory is updated to αu(m, s). Formally, 〈M,m0, αu, αn〉
defines the strategy λ such that λ(ρ · s) = αn(αˆu(m0, ρ), s) for all ρ ∈ (S1 ∪ S2)∗ and s ∈ S1,
where αˆu extends αu to sequences of positions as expected. A strategy is memoryless if
|M | = 1. For a finite-memory strategy λ1 of Player 1, let Gλ1 be the graph obtained as the
product of G with the Moore machine defining λ1, with initial vertex 〈m0, sinit〉 and where
(〈m, s〉, 〈m′, s′〉) is a transition in Gλ1 if m′ = αu(m, s), and either s ∈ S1 and s′ = αn(m, s),
or s ∈ S2 and (s, s′) ∈ E. The set of inifinite paths in Gλ1 and the set of plays consistent
with λ1 coincide. A similar definition can be given for the case of Player 2.
Objectives. An objective for Player 1 in G is a set of plays W ⊆ Plays(G). A strategy λ1
for Player 1 is winning for W in G if for all plays in pi ∈ Plays(G) that are consistent with
λ1, we have that pi ∈W . A strategy λ2 for Player 2 is spoiling for W in G if for all plays in
pi ∈ Plays(G) that are consistent with λ2, we have that pi 6∈ W . We consider the following
objectives:
Multi Energy objectives. Given an initial energy vector v0 ∈ Nk, the multi energy objective
PosEnergyG(v0) = {pi ∈ Plays(G) | ∀n ≥ 0 : v0 + EL(pi(n)) ∈ Nk} requires that the energy
level in all dimensions remains always nonnegative.
Multi Mean-payoff objectives. Given a threshold vector v ∈ Zk, the multi mean-payoff
objective MeanPayoffG(v) = {pi ∈ Playsup(G) | MP(pi) ≥ v} requires for all dimensions j
the mean-payoff for dimension j is at least v(j).
Decision problems. We consider the following decision problems:
The unknown initial credit problem asks, given an multi-weighted two-player game
structure G, to decide whether there exists an initial credit vector v0 ∈ Nk and a winning
strategy λ1 for Player 1 for the objective PosEnergyG(v0).
The mean-payoff threshold problem (for finite memory) asks, given an multi-weighted
two-player game structure G and a threshold vector v ∈ Zk, to decide whether there
exists a finite-memory strategy λ1 for Player 1 such that for all finite-memory strategies
λ2 of Player 2, outcomeG(λ1, λ2) ∈ MeanPayoffG(v).
Note that in the unknown initial credit problem, we allow arbitrary strategies (and we
show in Theorem 5 that actually finite-memory strategies are sufficient), while in the mean-
payoff threshold problem, we require finite-memory strategy which is restriction (according
to Theorem 8) of a more general problem of deciding the existence of arbitrary winning
strategies.
Determinacy and determinacy under finite-memory. A game G with an objective
W is determined if either Player 1 has a winning strategy, or Player 2 has a spoiling strategy.
A game G with an objective W is determined under finite-memory if either (a) Player 1 has
a finite-memory strategy λ1 such that for all finite-memory strategies λ2 of Player 2, we
have outcomeG(λ1, λ2) ∈W ; or (b) Player 2 has a finite-memory strategy λ2 such that for
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all finite-memory strategies λ1 of Player 1, we have outcomeG(λ1, λ2) 6∈ W . Games with
objectives W are determined (resp. determined under finite-memory) if all game structures
with objectives W are determined (resp. determined under finite-memory). We say that
determinacy and determined under finite-memory coincide for a class of objectives, if for all
objectives in the class and all game structures, the answer of the determinacy and determined
under finite-memory coincide (i.e., Player 1 has a winning strategy iff there is a finite-memory
winning strategy, and similarly for Player 2). Generalized mean-payoff and energy objectives
are measurable: (a) generalized mean-payoff objectives can be expressed as finite intersection
of mean-payoff objectives and mean-payoff objectives are complete for the third level of Borel
hierarchy [7]; and (b) generalized energy objectives can be expressed as finite intersection of
energy objectives, and enery objectives are closed sets. Hence determinacy of generalized
mean-payoff and energy games follows from the result of [15].
I Theorem 2 (Determinacy [15]). Generalized mean-payoff and energy games are determined.
3 Determinacy under Finite-memory and Inter-reducibility
In this section, we establish four results. First, we show that to win generalized energy games,
it is sufficient for Player 1 to play finite-memory strategies. Second, we show that to spoil
generalized energy games, it is sufficient for Player 2 to play memoryless strategies. As a
consequence, generalized energy games are determined under finite-memory. Third, using
this finite-memory determinacy result, we show that the decision problems for generalized
energy and mean-payoff games (see Section 2) are log-space inter-reducible. Finally, we
show that infinite-memory strategies are more powerful than finite-memory strategies in
generalized mean-payoff games.
For generalized energy games, we first show that finite-memory strategies are sufficient
for Player 1, and then that memoryless strategies are sufficient for Player 2.
I Lemma 3. For all multi-weighted two-player game structures G, the answer to the unknown
initial credit problem is Yes iff there exists a initial credit v0 ∈ Nk and a finite-memory
strategy λFM1 for Player 1 such that for all strategies λ2 of Player 2, outcomeG(λFM1 , λ2) ∈
PosEnergyG(v0).
Proof. One direction is trivial. For the other direction, assume that λ1 is a (not necessary
finite-memory) winning strategy for Player 1 in G with initial credit v0 ∈ Nk. We show how
to construct from λ1 a finite-memory strategy λFM1 which is winning against all strategies
of Player 2 for initial credit v0. For that we consider the unfolding of the game graph G in
which Player 1 plays according to λ1. This infinite tree, noted TG(λ1), has as set of nodes
all the prefixes of plays in G when Player 1 plays according to λ1. We associate to each
node ρ = s0s1 . . . sn in this tree the energy vector v0 + EL(ρ). As λ1 is winning, we have
that v0 + EL(ρ) ∈ Nk for all ρ. Now, consider the set (S1 ∪ S2)× Nk, and the relation v on
this set defined as follows: (s1, v1) v (s2, v2) iff s1 = s2 and v1 ≤ v2 i.e., for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
v1(i) ≤ v2(i). The relation v is a wqo (easy consequence of Lemma 1). As a consequence,
on every infinite branch pi = s0s1 . . . sn . . . of TG(λ1), there exists two positions i < j such
that Last(pi(i)) = Last(pi(j)) and EL(pi(i)) ≤ EL(pi(j)). We say that node j subsumes node
i. Now, let T FMG(λ1) be the tree TG(λ1) where we stop each branch when we reach a node n2
which subsumes one of its ancestor node n1. Clearly, T FMG(λ1) is finite. Also, it is easy to see
that Player 1 can play in the subtree rooted at n2 as she plays in the subtree rooted in n1
because its energy level in n2 is greater than in n1. From T FMG(λ1), we can construct a Moore
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q0q1 q2
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
(−1, 1)
(1,−1)
(−2, 0)
Figure 1 Player 1 (round states) wins with initial credit (2, 0) when Player 2 (square states) can
use memoryless strategies, but not when Player 2 can use arbitrary strategies.
machine which encode a finite-memory strategy λFM1 which is winning the generalized energy
game G as it is winning for initial energy level v0. 
I Lemma 4. [4] For all multi-weigthed two-player game structures G, the answer to the
unknown initial credit problem is No if and only if there exists a memoryless strategy λ2 for
Player 2, such that for all initial credit vectors v0 ∈ Nk and all strategies λ1 for Player 1 we
have outcomeG(λ1, λ2) 6∈ PosEnergyG(v0).
As a consequence of the two previous lemmas, we have the following theorem.
I Theorem 5. Generalized energy games are determined under finite-memory, and determi-
nacy coincide with determinacy under finite-memory for generalized energy games.
I Remark. Note that even if Player 2 can be restricted to play memoryless strategies in
generalized energy games, it may be that Player 1 is winning with some initial credit vector v0
when Player 2 is memoryless, and is not winning with the same initial credit vector v0 when
Player 2 can use arbitrary strategies. This situation is illustrated in Figure 1 where Player 1
(owning round states) can maintain the energy nonegative in all dimensions with initial credit
(2, 0) when Player 2 (owning square states) is memoryless. Indeed, either Player 2 chooses
the left edge from q0 to q1 and Player 1 wins, or Player 2 chooses the right edge from q0
to q2, and Player 1 wins as well by alternating the edges back to q0. Now, if Player 2 has
memory, then Player 2 wins by choosing first the right edge to q2, which forces Player 1 to
come back to q0 with multi-weight (−1, 1). The energy level is now (1, 1) in q0 and Player 2
chooses the left edge to q1 which is losing for Player 1. Note that Player 1 wins with initial
credit (2, 1) and (3, 0) (or any larger credit) against all arbitrary strategies of Player 2.
We now show that generalized mean-payoff games (where players are restricted to play
finite-memory strategies by definition) are log-space equivalent to generalized energy games.
First note that the mean-payoff threshold problem with threshold vector v ∈ Zk can be
reduced to the mean-payoff threshold problem with threshold vector {0}k, by shifting all
multi-weights in the game graph by v (which has the effect of shifting the mean-payoff
value by v). Given this reduction, the following result shows that the unknown initial credit
problem (for multi-energy games) and the mean-payoff threshold problem (with finite-memory
strategies) are equivalent.
I Theorem 6. For all multi-weigthed two-player game structures G with dimension k,
the answer to the unknown initial credit problem is Yes if and only if the answer to the
mean-payoff threshold problem (for finite memory) with threshold vector {0}k is Yes.
Proof. First, assume that there exists a winning strategy λ1 for Player 1 in G for the multi
energy objective PosEnergyG(v0) (for some v0). Theorem 5 establishes that finite memory is
K. Chatterjee, L. Doyen, T. A. Henzinger, and J.-F. Raskin 511
sufficient to win multi-energy games, so we can assume that λ1 has finite memory. Consider
the restriction of the graph Gλ1 to the reachable vertices, and we show that the energy vector
of every simple cycle is nonnegative. By contradcition, if there exists a simple cycle with
energy vector negative in one dimension, then the infinite path that reaches this cycle and
loops through it forever would violate the objective PosEnergyG(v0) regardless of the vector
v0.
Now, this shows that every reachable cycle in Gλ1 has nonnegative mean-payoff value in
all dimensions, hence λ1 is winning for the multi mean-payoff objective MeanPayoffG({0}k).
Second, assume that there exists a finite-memory strategy λ1 for Player 1 that is winning
in G for the multi mean-payoff objective MeanPayoffG({0}k). By the same argument as
above, all simple cycles in Gλ1 are nonnegative and the strategy λ1 is also winning for the
objective PosEnergyG(v0) for some v0. Taking v0 = {nW}k where n is the number of states
in Gλ1 (which bounds the length of the acyclic paths) and W ∈ Z is the largest weight in
the game suffices. 
Note that the result of Theorem 6 does not hold for arbitrary strategies as shown in the
following lemma.
I Lemma 7. In generalized mean-payoff games, infinite memory may be necessary to win
(finite-memory strategies may not be sufficient).
Proof. To show this, we first need to define the mean-payoff vector of arbitrary plays
(because arbitrary strategies, i.e., infinite-memory strategies, may produce non-ultimately
periodic plays). In particular, the limit of 1n · EL(pi(n)) for n → ∞ may not exist for
arbitrary plays pi. Therefore, two possible definitions are usually considered, namely either
MP(pi) = lim infn→∞ 1n · EL(pi(n)), or MP(pi) = lim supn→∞ 1n · EL(pi(n)). In both cases,
better payoff can be obtained with infinite memory: the example of Figure 2 shows a game
where all states belong to Player 1. We claim that (a) for MP, Player 1 can achieve a
threshold vector (1, 1), and (b) for MP, Player 1 can achieve a threshold vector (2, 2); (c) if
we restrict Player 1 to use a finite-memory strategy, then it is not possible to win the multi
mean-payoff objective with threshold (1, 1) (and thus also not with (2, 2)). To prove (a),
consider the strategy that visits n times qa and then n times qb, and repeats this forever
with increasing value of n. This guarantees a mean-payoff vector (1, 1) for MP because in
the long-run roughly half of the time is spent in qa and roughly half of the time in qb. To
prove (b), consider the strategy that alternates visits to qa and qb such that after the nth
alternation, the self-loop on the visited state q (q ∈ {qa, qb}) is taken so many times that the
average frequency of q gets larger than 1n in the current finite prefix of the play. This is always
possible and achieves threshold (2, 2) for MP. Note that the above two strategies require
infinite memory. To prove (c), notice that finite-memory strategies produce an ultimately
periodic play and therefore MP and MP coincide with MP. It is easy to see that such a
play cannot achieve (1, 1) because the periodic part would have to visit both qa and qb and
then the mean-payoff vector (v1, v2) of the play would be such that v1 + v2 < 2 and thus
v1 = v2 = 1 is impossible. 
Theorem 6 and Lemma 7, along with Theorem 5 gives the following result.
I Theorem 8. Generalized mean-payoff games are determined under finite-memory, however
determinacy and determined under finite-memory do not coincide for generalized mean-payoff
games.
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qa qb
(2, 0) (0, 2)
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
Figure 2 A generalized mean-payoff game where infinite memory is necessary to win (Lemma 7).
4 coNP-completeness for Finite-Memory Strategies
In this section, we present a nondeterministic polynomial time algorithm to recognize the
instances for which there is no winning strategies for Player 1 in a multi-energy game. First,
we show that the one-player version of this game can be solved by checking the existence of a
circuit (i.e., a not necessarily simple cycle) with overall nonnegative effect in all dimensions.
Second, we build on this and the memoryless result for Player 2 to define a coNP algorithm.
The main result (Theorem 9) is derived from Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 below.
I Theorem 9. The unknown initial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for
multi-weighted two-player game structures are coNP-complete.
coNP upper bound. First, we need the following result about finding zero circuits in multi-
weighted directed graphs (a graph is a one-player game). A zero circuit is a finite sequence
s0s1 . . . sn such that s0 = sn, (si, si+1) ∈ E for all 0 ≤ i < n, and
∑n−1
i=0 w(si, si+1) =
(0, 0, . . . , 0). The circuit need not be simple.
I Lemma 10 ([14]). Determining if a k-dimensional directed graph contains a zero circuit
can be done in polynomial time.
I Lemma 11. The unknown initial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-
weighted two-player game structures are in coNP.
Proof. By Lemma 4, we know that Player 2 can be restricted to play memoryless strategies.
A coNP algorithm can guess a memoryless strategy λ and check in polynomial time that it
is winning using the following argument.
First, consider the graph Gλ as a one-player game (in which all states belong to player 1.
We show that if there exists an initial energy level v0 and an infinite play pi = s0s1 . . . sn . . . in
Gλ such that pi ∈ PosEnergy(v0) then there exist a reachable circuit inGλ that has nonnegative
effect in all dimensions. To show that, we extend pi with the energy information as follows:
pi′ = (s0, w0)(s1, w1) . . . (sn, wn) . . . where w0 = v0 and for all i ≥ 1, wi = v0 + EL(pi(i)). As
pi ∈ PosEnergy(v0), we know that for all i ≥ 0, wi ∈ Nk. So, we can define the following order
on the pairs (s, w) ∈ (S1 ∪ S2)× Nk in the run: (s, w) v (s′, w′) iff s = s′ and w(j) ≤ w′(j)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. From Lemma 1, it is easy to show that v is a wqo. Then there exist two
positions i1 < i2 in pi′ such that (si1 , wi1) v (si2 , wi2). The circuit underlying those two
positions has nonnegative effect in all dimensions.
Based on this, we can decide if there exists an initial energy vector v0 and an infinite path
in Gλ that satisfies PosEnergyG(v0) using the result of Lemma 10 on modified version of Gλ
obtained as follows. In every state of Gλ, we add k self-loops with respective multi-weight
(−1, 0, . . . , 0), (0,−1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , (0, . . . , 0,−1), i.e. each self-loop removes one unit of
energy in one dimension. It is easy to see that Gλ has a circuit with nonnegative effect in all
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C1
C2
Ck
...
}
}
}
literal
literal
literal
Figure 3 Game graph construction for a 3SAT formula (Lemma 12).
dimensions if and only if the modified Gλ has a zero circuit, which can be determined in
polynomial time. The result follows. 
Lower bound: coNP-hardness. We show that the unknown initial credit problem for
multi-weighted two-player game structures is coNP-hard. We present a reduction from the
complement of the 3SAT problem which is NP-complete [16].
Hardness proof. We show that the problem of deciding whether Player 1 has a winning
strategy for the unknown initial credit problem for multi-weighted two-player game structures
is at least as hard as deciding whether a 3SAT formula is unsatisfiable. Consider a 3SAT
formula ψ in CNF with clauses C1, C2, . . . , Ck over variables {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, where each
clause consists of disjunctions of exactly three literals (a literal is a variable or its complement).
Given the formula ψ, we construct a game graph as shown in Figure 3. The game graph is
as follows: from the initial position, Player 1 chooses a clause, then from a clause Player 2
chooses a literal that appears in the clause (i.e., makes the clause true). From every literal
the next position is the initial position. We now describe the multi-weight labeling function
w. In the multi-weight function there is a component for every literal. For edges from the
initial position to the clause positions, and from the clause positions to the literals, the weight
for every component is 0. We now define the weight function for the edges from literals back
to the initial position: for a literal y, and the edge from y to the initial position, the weight
for the component of y is 1, the weight for the component of the complement of y is −1,
and for all the other components the weight is 0. We now define a few notations related to
assignments of truth values to literals. We consider assignments that assign truth values
to all the literals. An assignment is valid if for every literal the truth value assigned to the
literal and its complement are complementary (i.e., for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if xi is assigned true
(resp. false), then the complement xi of xi is assigned false (resp. true)). An assignment
that is not valid is conflicting (i.e., for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, both xi and xi are assigned the same
truth value). If the formula ψ is satisfiable, then there is a valid assignment that satisfies all
the clauses. If the formula ψ is not satisfiable, then every assignment that satisfies all the
clauses must be conflicting. We now present two directions of the hardness proof.
ψ satisfiable implies Player 2 winning. We show that if ψ is satisfiable, then Player 2 has
a memoryless winning strategy. Since ψ is satisfiable, there is a valid assignment A that
satisfies every clause. The memoryless strategy is constructed from the assignment A as
follows: for a clause Ci, the strategy chooses a literal as successor that appears in Ci and is
set to true by the assignment. Consider an arbitrary strategy for Player 1, and the infinite
play: the literals visited in the play are all assigned truth values true by A, and the infinite
play must visit some literal infinitely often. Consider the literal x that appears infinitely
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often in the play, then the complement literal x is never visited, and every time literal x is
visited, the component corresponding to x decreases by 1, and since x appears infinitely often
it follows that the play is winning for Player 2 for every finite initial credit. It follows that
the strategy for Player 2 is winning, and the answer to the unknown initial credit problem is
“No".
ψ not satisfiable implies Player 1 is winning. We now show that if ψ is not satisfiable, then
Player 1 is winning. By determinacy, it suffices to show that Player 2 is not winning, and
by existence of memoryless winning strategy for Player 2 (Lemma 4), it suffices to show
that there is no memoryless winning strategy for Player 2. Fix an arbitrary memoryless
strategy for Player 2, (i.e., in every clause Player 2 chooses a literal that appears in the
clause). If we consider the assignment A obtained from the memoryless strategy, then since
ψ is not satisfiable it follows that the assignment A is conflicting. Hence there must exist
clause Ci and Cj and variable xk such that the strategy chooses the literal xk in Ci and
the complement variable xk in Cj . The strategy for Player 1 that at the starting position
alternates between clause Ci and Cj , along with that the initial credit of 1 for the component
of xk and xk, and 0 for all other components, ensures that the strategy for Player 2 is not
winning. Hence the answer to the unknown initial credit problem is “Yes", and we have the
following result.
I Lemma 12. The unknown initial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-
weighted two-player game structures are coNP-hard.
Observe that our hardness proof works with weights restricted to the set {−1, 0, 1}.
5 NP-completeness for Memoryless Strategies
In this section we consider the unknown initial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems
for multi-weighted two-player game structures when Player 1 is restricted to use memoryless
strategies. We will show NP-completeness for these problems.
I Lemma 13. The unknown intial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-
weighted two-player game structures for memoryless strategies for Player 1 lie in NP.
Proof. The inclusion in NP is obtained as follows: the polynomial witness is the memoryless
strategy for Player 1, and once the strategy is fixed we obtain a game graph with choices for
Player 2 only. The verification problem for the unknown initial credit checks that for every
dimension there is no negative cycle, and the verification problem for mean-payoff threshold
checks that for every dimension every cycle satisfy the threshold condition. Both the above
verification problem can be achieved in polynomial time by solving the energy-game and
mean-payoff game problem on graphs with choices for Player 2 only [13, 3, 6]. The desired
result follows. 
Lemma 14 shows NP-hardness for dimension k = 2 and arbitrary integral weights, and is
obtained by a reduction from the Knapsack problem. If k = 1, then the problems reduces to
the classical energy and mean-payoff games, and is in NP ∩ coNP [3, 6, 20] (so the hardness
result cannot be obtained for k = 1).
I Lemma 14. The unknown intial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-
weighted two-player game structures for memoryless strategies for Player 1 are NP-hard,
even in one-player game structures with dimension k = 2 for the weight function.
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In Lemma 15 we show the hardness of the problem when the weights are in {−1, 0, 1},
but the dimension is arbitrary. It has been shown in [12] that if the weights are {−1, 0, 1}
and the dimension is 2, then the problem can be solved in polynomial time.
I Lemma 15. The unknown intial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-
weighted two-player game structures for memoryless strategies for Player 1 are NP-hard,
even in one-player game structures when weights are restricted to {−1, 0, 1}.
Proof. We present a reduction from the 3SAT problem. Consider a 3SAT formula Φ over
a set X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} of variables, and a set C1, C2, . . . , Cm of clauses such that each
clause has 3-literals (a literal is a variable or its complement). We construct a one-player
game structure with a weight function of dimension m from Φ. The set of positions is
S1 = X ∪ {(xi, j) | xi ∈ X, j ∈ {T, F}} ∪ {xn+1} and S2 = ∅. The set of edges is as
follows: E = {(xi, (xi, T )), (xi, (xi, F )) | xi ∈ X} ∪ {((xi, T ), xi+1), ((xi, F ), xi+1) | xi ∈
X} ∪ {(xn+1, x1)}. Intuitively, in the game structure, for every variable Player 1 has a choice
to set xi as “True" (edge from xi to (xi, T )), and choice to set xi as “False" (edge from xi
to (xi, F )). From (xi, T ) and (xi, F ) the next position is xi+1, and from the position xn+1
the next position is x1. The weight function w : E → Zm has m dimensions: (a) for an edge
e = (xi, (xi, T )) (resp. e = (xi, (xi, F ))) and 1 ≤ k ≤ m, the k-th component of w(e) is 1 if
the choice xi as “True" (resp. “False") satisfies clause Ck, and otherwise the k-th component
is 0; (b) for edges e = ((xi, j), xi+1), with j ∈ {T, F}, every component of w(e) is 0; and
(c) for the edge e = (xn+1, x1), for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m, the k-th component of w(e) = −1. If Φ is
satisfiable, then consider a satisfying assignment A, and we construct a memoryless strategy
λ1 as follows: for a position xi, if A(xi) is “True", then choose (xi, T ), otherwise choose
(xi, F ). The memoryless strategy λ1 with initial credit vector {0}m ensures that the answer
to the unknown initial credit problem for memoryless strategies is “Yes". Conversely, if there
is a memoryless strategy λ1 for the unknown initial credit problem, then the memoryless
strategy must satisfy every clause. A satisfying assignment A for Φ is as follows: A(xi) is
“True" if λ1(xi) = (xi, T ), and “False", otherwise. It follows that Φ is satisfiable iff the answer
to the unknown initial credit problem for memoryless strategies is “Yes". The argument for
the mean-payoff threshold problem is analogous. The desired result follows. 
The following theorem follows from the results of Lemma 13, Lemma 14 and Lemma 15.
I Theorem 16. The unknown initial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-
weighted two-player game structures for memoryless strategies for Player 1 are NP-complete.
6 Conclusion
In this work we considered games with multiple mean-payoff and energy objectives, and
established determinacy under finite-memory, inter-reducibility of these two classes of games
for finite-memory strategies, and improved the complexity bounds from EXPSPACE to
coNP-complete.
Two interesting problems are open: (A) for generalized mean-payoff games, the winning
strategies with infinite memory are more powerful than finite-memory strategies, and the
complexity of solving generalized mean-payoff games with infinite-memory strategies remains
open. (B) it is not knwon how to compute the exact or approximate Pareto curve (trade-off
curve) for multi-objective mean-payoff and energy games.
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